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CONTRACT LAW-LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS-TEMPORARY INSUR-
ANCE-BINDING RECEIPTS IMPOSING CONDITIONS PRECEDENT UPON
TEMPORARY INSURANCE COVERAGE HELD INEFFECTIVE IN PENN-
SYLVANIA.
Collister v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co. (Pa. 1978)
Plaintiff's husband applied to the defendant, Nationwide Life Insurance
Company (Nationwide), for a life insurance policy.1 Through its agent,
Nationwide subsequently received from the husband a completed application
form and a two month premium payment. 2 In exchange for this prepay-
ment, the agent gave the applicant a "conditional receipt." 3 The application
had contained a lengthy and technically phrased provision indicating that the
policy would not take effect until the applicant had undergone a required
medical examination, 4 The conditional receipt, however, clearly specified
that no insurance coverage would be provided until the completion of a
medical examination that satisfied Nationwide that the applicant was an
insurable risk.
5
1. Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 582, 388 A.2d 1346, 1347 (1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 871 (1979).
2. 479 Pa. at 582, 388 A.2d at 1347.
3. Id. For the contents of the conditional receipt, see note 5 infra. For an explanation of
conditional receipts as a type of insurance instrument, see notes 11-19 and accompanying text
infra.
4. Record at 4a, 12a. The pertinent provision occupied the bottom third of the first of two
pages to be completed by the applicant. Id. It provided as follows:
The insurance applied for shall not be considered in force unless a policy shall have been
issued by the Company, received and accepted by me, and the first full premium thereon
during the lifetime and continued insurability of the Proposed Insured and (without prej-
udice to the Proposed Insured) during the lifetime and continued insurability of each
person proposed for coverage under the Family Rider or the Children's Rider (whichever
is applicable and if applied for); except that if the first full premium on the premium
payment basis selected herein for the insurance applied for is paid to an authorized agent
of the Company on the date this application is signed and the receipt attached to this
application and bearing a corresponding printed number is delivered and if the following
acts are completed, (a) receipt by the Company of a fully completed application which
includes fully completed medical examinations, and (b) completion of all further investiga-
tion and the Company is satisfied that the Proposed Insured and (without prejudice to the
Proposed Insured) each person proposed for coverage under the Family Rider or the
Children's Rider (whichever is applicable and if applied for) is insurable and qualified
under the Company's rules, limits and standards on the plan and for the amount applied
for and at the premium specified herein, the said insurance shall take effect and be in
force from the date of the last medical examination, or if no medical examination is re-
quired, on the application date subject to the provisions, terms and conditions of the
policy applied for unless otherwise specified as to Health Insurance in question 17. Unless
all acts required are completed, no insurance shall take effect hereunder.
Id. For several appraisals of the insurance industry's use of this and similar verbiage, see notes
19 & 91 infra.
5. 479 Pa. at 599 app., 388 A.2d at 1356 app. The front side of the conditional receipt was
headed by bold type which stated: CONDITIONAL FIRST LIFE PREMIUM RECEIPT: NO
INSURANCE WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY UNLESS THE
ACTS REQUIRED BY THIS RECEIPT ARE COMPLETED. NO AGENT OF THE COM-
PANY IS AUTHORIZED TO CHANGE ANY ACT REQUIRED. Id. Following this heading
was a body of smaller type which included a provision similar in wording and length to that
(800)
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Approximately six weeks after the application date, the plaintiff's hus-
band was killed in an automobile accident without having submitted to the
required examination. 6 At the time of his death, Nationwide had not yet
acted upon the application. 7  When Nationwide later denied liability, the
plaintiff, as the named beneficiary in the insurance application, commenced
an action to recover benefits under the policy."
Ruling that a condition precedent to the claimed insurance coverage had
not been fulfilled, the trial court granted Nationwide's motion for summary
judgment. 9  The superior court affirmed without an opinion. 10  On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that when an insurer
accepts payment of the first premium along with an application for life insur-
ance, the insurer will be found to have issued temporary insurance unless it
can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant had no
reasonable basis for believing that insurance coverage would commence im-
mediately. Collister v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388
A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 871 (1979).
Binding receipts" have long been familiar documents in life insurance
transactions. 1 2  Typically, they are issued by the insurer to an applicant
following the submission of an application when the policy itself is not to be
immediately delivered. 13  Binding receipts are virtually always issued upon
partial or total prepayment of the premiums to become due under the pol-
found in the application. See id. For a portion of the application form, see note 4 supra. The
reverse side of the receipt set forth only two provisions, each in type about twice as large as
that found on the front, which provided:
IMPORTANT
The Company reserves the right to require a medical examination. Until you can provide
proof that you are insurable, the Company provides no insurance.
If you are requested to have an examination, don't delay. Make arrangements promptly.
There is no insurance until a satisfactory medical examination has been made and all the
conditions of this receipt are completed.
479 Pa. at 599 app., 388 A.2d at 1356 app. Although the court acknowledged that the applicant
had been orally informed by the Nationwide agent that he would need a medical examination,
the Collister court questioned whether the applicant was also orally informed that he would not
be covered until he underwent that examination. Id. at 596, 388 A.2d at 1354-55. See notes 52
& 53 and accompanying text infra.
6. 479 Pa. at 582, 388 A.2d at 1347.
7. Id.
8. Id. The plaintiff brought suit to recover $42,500 from Nationwide. Record at 45a. This
amount represented the aggregate of the coverage applied for by the decedent: $10,000, with
double indemnity for accidental death, and $22,500 level term insurance. 479 Pa. at 582, 388
A.2d at 1347.
9. 479 Pa. at 582, 388 A.2d at 1347. There were cross-motions for summary judgment. Id.
10. Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 702, 347 A.2d 487 (1975)
(per curiam), rev'd, 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 871 (1979).
11. Binding receipts are frequently referred to as "binders." See Smith v. Westland Life
Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 113, 539 P.2d 433, 435, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 651 (1975); 1 G. COUCH,
INSURANCE §§ 14:26-14:46 46, at 605-33 (2d ed. 1959); 7 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 902A, at
197-213 (3d ed. 1963).
12. See Comment, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 180 (1938). More than
a century ago, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a dispute involving a
binding receipt in Insurance Co. v. Young's Adm'r, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 85 (1875).
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 180. Absent a binding receipt, an applicant for life insur-
ance is generally not covered until the policy has been delivered to him by the insurance
1978-1979]
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icy.14 Aside from their function as documentation of such advance payment,
binding receipts frequently purport to define the contractual relationship be-
tween applicant and insurance company in the period between the initial
application and either issuance of a policy or rejection of the risk.
15
Conditional binding receipts provide for coverage which is dependent
upon certain specified contingencies. 1 6  These receipts contemplate: 1) that
interim coverage is to attach only upon the fulfillment of some condition
precedent, such as a medical examination; or 2) that coverage is subject to a
condition subsequent, and will attach at a specific time and continue unless
the applicant is found to be an uninsurable risk.
17
carrier. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 84 (1960). By
not issuing a binding receipt, the insurer avoids liability if the applicant dies during the period
necessary to process his application. Id. There are, however, disadvantages for the insurer who
does not utilize a binding receipt. Id. The application, as an offer by the applicant, can be
withdrawn. Id. If this occurs, the company loses a customer as well as any expenses incurred in
investigating the applicant's insurability. Comment, Life Insurance Receipts: The Mystery of the
Non-binding Binder. 63 YALE L.J. 523, 523-24 (1954). Though individually small, such unre-
coverable losses can accumulate substantially. id.
14. Comment, supra note 13, at 523-24. By securing payment in advance, the carrier ob-
viates the possibility of losses due to the revocation of applications. Id. at 524. Moreover, any
advance nonrefundable premium is likely to cover all investigatory and processing costs. Id. at
523. Applicants who withdraw are extremely unlikely to resort to lawsuits to recover their ad-
vance payments, which are generally relatively small sums. Id. Most significantly, the insurer
enjoys the use of the money advanced from the date of application regardless of the ultimate
contractual relationship established. Id.
15. Harris v. Meyers, 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 607, 612, 52 A.2d 375, 378 (1947). The Harris
court noted:
A binder has been defined to be: "A written instrument, used when a policy cannot be
immediately issued, to evidence that the insurance coverage attaches at a specified time,
and continues . . . until the policy is issued or the risk is declined and notice thereof
given" . Binders are commonly evidenced by binder certificates in writing or by
written receipts.
Id., quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 269 (2d ed. 1934).
More recently, a federal court has observed:
An insurance binder is a contract of temporary insurance to be effective insurance
coverage until a formal policy is drafted and issued. It is not a complete contract in a
sense, but is evidence of the existence of a contractual obligation to be expressed in
complete written form at a later date.
Carideo v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 317 F. Supp. 607, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified per
curiam, 450 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1971), citing Lester v. Century Indem. Co., 356 Pa. 15, 50 A.2d
678 (1947).
16. See G. COUCH, supra note 11, §§ 14:39-:41, at 619-24.
17. Id. §§ 14:40, :41, :45, at 620-24, 630-32. Many commentators use a closely analogous
categorization, labelling conditional receipts as either the "approval" or "satisfaction" type. See
Comment, supra note 13, at 527-28. The approval type is the most common, and provides a
form of retroactive coverage; if the application is approved by the home office, the policy be-
comes effective as of the date the premium is prepaid and the application is signed. Id. at 528.
See C. COUCH, supra note 11, § 14:41, at 621-25. The satisfaction type generally specifies that
coverage commences upon the furnishing of proof to the insurance company that the applicant
is an insurable risk. Comment, supra note 13, at 528. See G. COUCH, supra note 11, § 14:45, at
630-32. This proof is often required in the form of a favorable medical examination. Id. at 630.
The conditional receipt in the case sub judice is within the satisfaction class. See note 5 and
accompanying text supra. Any system of classification is not likely to be helpful in analyzing the
contractual status of insurer and applicant since conditional receipts vary widely in contents and
wording, thereby resisting generalizations. See Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 324
Pa. 97, 100, 187 A. 403, 405 (1936).
802 [VOL. 24: p. 800
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In determining the rights and obligations, if any, that exist in the in-
terim period, courts are in agreement that the application and binding re-
ceipt should be construed together as the integrated agreement between the
parties.' 8 Additionally, since both documents are prepared by the insurer,
their construction is subject to the universal principle that any ambiguities in
language must be strictly construed against the insurer. 19
Courts in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions have long confronted
situations in which life insurance applicants paid premiums in advance, re-
ceived binding receipts, and died before their policies were issued.20 As
early as 1936, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Stonsz v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society,2 1 recognized that temporary life insurance, which is
effective until issuance of the actual policy, could be created by a binding
receipt provided that this was the intention of the parties.2 2 The most in-
fluential and frequently cited opinion in this area, however, was written by
18. DeCesare v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 Mass. 401, 407, 180 N.E. 154, 156 (1932);
McAvoy Vitrified Brick Co. v. North Am. Life Assurance Co., 395 Pa. 75, 80, 149 A.2d 42, 44
(1959). In DeCesare, the court stated: "Upon the facts stated in the record we are of opinion
that the agreement in the receipt, when construed with the application, created a valid contract
for temporary insurance . . ." 278 Mass. at 407, 180 N.E. at 156. Similarly, in McAvoy, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted: "The branch manager . . . signed and delivered . . . a
'deposit receipt' and an 'interim assurance certificate.' These two documents will have to be
considered in detail, because they, with the application, constitute the integration of the con-
tract between the parties if any contract existed." 395 Pa. at 80, 149 A.2d at 44. See G. COUCH,
supra note 11, § 14:35, at 615.
19. G. COUCH, supra note 11, § 14:36, at 616. The rationale behind this principle was
perhaps best stated by Judge Learned Hand in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160
F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). Scrutinizing the wording of a life insur-
ance application, Judge Hand wrote:
An underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context, but the appli-
cation was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to persons utterly unac-
quainted with the niceties of life insurance, who would read it colloquially. It is the
understanding of such persons that counts; and not one in a hundred would suppose that
he would [not] be covered .... To demand that persons wholly unfamiliar with insur-
ance shall spell all this out in the very teeth of the language used, is unpardonable ....
A man must read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek
to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their
craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion.
160 F.2d at 601-02 (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947); Smiley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 321 Mich. 60, 32 N.W.2d 48 (1948);
Leube v. Prudential Ins. Co., 147 Ohio St. 450, 72 N.E.2d 76 (1947); Steelnack v. Knights Life
Ins. Co. of America, 423 Pa. 205, 223 A.2d 734 (1966); McAvoy Vitrified Brick Co. v. North
Am. Life Assurance Co., 395 Pa. 75, 149 A.2d 42 (1959).
21. 324 Pa. 97, 187 A. 403 (1936). In Stonsz, a miner applied for a policy containing provi-
sions for death benefits, annuity payments for disability, and double indemnity. id. at 99, 187
A. at 404. The applicant sought to recover for severe injuries which he suffered between appli-
cation and issuance of the policy. Id. at 99-100, 187 A. at 404. Suit was subsequently brought
on the policy rather than on the binding receipt received by the applicant. Id. at 104, 187 A. at
406. The court, resolving an ambiguity in favor of the applicant, held the carrier liable. Id. at
107, 187 A. at 408.
22. Id. at 101-04, 187 A. at 405-06. In deciding whether temporary coverage takes effect,
the Stonsz court posited as the threshold question: "Does the language of this receipt indicate
an intention to create a temporary insurance for the time during which the approval of the
application was pending?" Id. at 102, 187 A. at 405.
1978-1979]
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the Supreme Court of California in 1954 in the case of Ransom v. Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Co. 2 3  In Ransom, an application was submitted
along with full premium prepayment in return for a receipt signed by the
company's agent.2 4  A clause in the application which purported to state the
terms of interim coverage was susceptible to two interpretations.2 5  The
court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the applicant 2 6 and held that a
temporary life insurance policy had taken effect immediately upon the in-
surer's acceptance of the application and premium.2 7  Underlying the Ran-
som decision was the court's conviction that the "understanding of an ordi-
nary person is the standard which must be used in construing the contract,
and such a person upon reading the application would believe that he would
secure the benefit of immediate coverage by paying the premium in advance
of delivery of the policy." 28 Where ambiguity existed in temporary insur-
ance provisions, the interpretation most accurately reflecting the reasonable
expectations of an ordinary applicant was therefore to be given effect.2 9
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the Ransom rule of con-
struction in McAvoy Vitrified Brick Co. v. North American Life Assurance
Co. 3 0 Subsequently, in Steelnack v. Knights Life Insurance Co. of
23. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954).
24. Id. at 422, 274 P.2d at 634.
25. Id. at 423-25, 274 P.2d at 634-36. The clause stated:
If the first premium is paid in full in exchange for the attached receipt signed by the
Company's agent when this application is signed the insurance shall be in force . . . pro-
vided the Company shall be satisfied that the Proposed Insured was at that date accept-
able under the Company's rules for insurance upon the plan at the rate of premium and
for the amount applied for, but that if such first premium is not so paid or if the Company
is not satisfied as to such acceptability, no insurance shall be in force until both the first
premium is paid in full and the policy is delivered....
Id. at 423, 274 P.2d at 634. The Ransom court determined that this clause could mean: 1) that
the insurer's satisfaction as to the applicant's insurability was a condition precedent to the exis-
tence of any contract and hence any coverage in the interim period; or 2) that the insurance
applied for would be effective from the date of the application, subject to termination should
the applicant be later deemed an uninsurable risk by the company. Id. at 425, 274 P.2d at
635-36. The court chose the latter alternative. Id. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
26. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
27. 43 Cal. 2d at 425, 274 P.2d at 635.
28. Id., 274 P.2d at 636. The court continued:
There is an obvious advantage to the company in obtaining payment of the premium
when the application is made, and it would be unconscionable to permit the company,
after using language to induce payment of the premium at that time, to escape the obliga-
tion which an ordinary applicant would reasonably believe had been undertaken by the
insurer. Moreover, defendant drafted the clause, and had it wished to make clear that its
satisfaction was a condition precedent to a contract, it could easily have done so by using
unequivocal terms. While some of the language tends to support the company's position,
it does no more than produce an ambiguity, and the ambiguity must be resolved against
defendant.
Id. (citations omitted). These concepts have been accepted by a growing number of jurisdic-
tions, including Pennsylvania. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
29. 43 Cal. 2d at 425, 274 P.2d at 636.
30. 395 Pa. 75, 87-88, 149 A.2d 42, 47-48 (1959). The McAvoy court indicated that binding
receipts as well as applications were to be interpreted in accordance with the Ransom rule of
construction, stating:
We are at once met with several ambiguities in the language of the receipt .... We must
[VOL. 24: p. 800
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America, 31 the court admonished a defendant insurance company that if it
"had wished to make the taking of a medical examination a condition prece-
dent to the contract, it should have done so with explicit language" in the
conditional receipt. 32  It has thus been accepted in Pennsylvania that an
insurance company can impose conditions precedent to interim coverage 33 if
such conditions are stated in conspicuous, unequivocal language that is un-
derstandable to the ordinary layman.
34
Another trend in the area of insurance law, as illustrated in dicta by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., 35 is
the treatment of insurance contracts as adhesive in nature. 36 Displaying
similar viewpoints, courts in other jurisdictions have vigilantly protected the
therefore resolve the ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, which
was their author .... The receipt provides, "Under no circumstances will the company
assume any liability until a policy has been delivered and the premium has been settled
in full, unless an interim assurance certificate has been issued." This clause we construe
to mean that by the issuance of an interim assurance certificate the company does assume
liability.
Id. at 84, 149 A.2d at 46 (citations omitted). The court further noted:
The conclusion that we have reached . . . is . . . not only based on sound principles
of contract law, but is supported by the weight of Pennsylvania authority and the ten-
dency of the courts of other jurisdictions in recent years to resolve questions arising out of
temporary insurance contracts in favor of the insured.
Id. at 86-87, 149 A.2d at 47.
31. 423 Pa. 205, 223 A.2d 734 (1966). In Steelnack, a binder issued pursuant to a premium
prepayment was designed to condition interim coverage upon a completed medical examination.
Id. at 207, 223 A.2d at 735. According to the court, however, the opposite meaning was implicit
therein, "namely, that the coverage began on the date of the binder subject to being terminated
if the medical examination revealed the insured not in good health." Id. The court therefore
held that the requested examination was arguably a condition subsequent that could terminate
coverage if the company were to find the applicant an uninsurable risk; it could not, however,
be construed as a condition precedent. Id. at 208, 223 A.2d at 735.
32. Id. at 208, 223 A.2d at 735.
33. Id.
34. Id. Ambiguous language is apt to be construed in a manner quite different from that
intended by the insurer. This was certainly the result in Ransom, McAvoy, and Steelnack. See
notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra. California courts have further required that an insur-
ance company must inform the applicant of any limiting conditions upon temporary coverage.
See, e.g., Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 123, 539 P.2d 433, 441, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 657 (1975); Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 461, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 387, rehearing denied, 272 Cal. App. 2d 462, 78 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1969).
35. 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977).
36. Id. at 72, 371 A.2d at 196. The Brakeman court stated:
The rationale underlying the strict contractual approach reflected in our past deci-
sions is that courts should not presume to interfere with the freedom of private contracts
and redraft insurance policy provisions where the intent of the parties is expressed by
clear and unambiguous language. We are of the opinion, however, that this argument,
based on the view that insurance policies are private contracts in the traditional sense, is
no longer persuasive. . . . An insurance contract is not a negotiated agreement; rather its
conditions are by and large dictated by the insurance company to the insured. The only
aspect of the contract over which the insured can "bargain" is the monetary amount of
coverage.
Id. Although Brakeman involved a notice provision in a policy of automobile liability insurance,
the court's comments were intended to encompass all insurance instruments, including life in-
surance binding receipts. Id. at 72-73, 371 A.2d at 196.
1978-1979]
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reasonable expectations of insurance applicants.3 7  Courts have consequently
developed a heightened sensitivity to ambiguities in temporary insurance
provisions, and have become more willing to construe these provisions liber-
ally in favor of applicants to avoid unconscionable results.3 8 Where the lan-
guage used has been clear and unequivocal, however, courts have consis-
tently enforced temporary insurance provisions as written.3 9
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania4 0 began its discussion of the issues
presented in Collister with a lengthy survey of the pertinent case law. 41
Drawing upon the views of various commentators and tribunals, 42 the court
emphasized the adhesive quality of insurance documents, 43 stating that "[t]o
accept the insurer's argument that its liability is contingent on a condition
precedent permits the insurer to hold itself immune from liability .. .while
at the same time enjoying the benefits that flow from immediate collection of
the premium." 44 The court maintained that normal contract principles are
no longer strictly applicable to insurance transactions, 45 and concluded that
the reasonable expectation of the insured has clearly become the paramount
consideration in determining rights under insurance policies. 46
37. For example, in strongly worded dicta, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated:
While insurance policies and binders are contractual in nature, they are not ordinary
contracts but are "contracts of adhesion" between parties not equally situated. The com-
pany is expert in its field and its varied and complex instruments are prepared by it
unilaterally whereas the assured .. . is a layman unversed in insurance provisions and
practices. He justifiably places heavy reliance on the knowledge and good faith of the
company and its representatives and they, in turn, are under correspondingly heavy re-
sponsibility to him. His reasonable expectations in the transaction may not justly be frus-
trated and courts have properly molded their governing interpretative principles with that
uppermost in mind.
Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 305, 208 A.2d 638, 644 (1965) (citations
omitted). See also Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 123, 539 P.2d 433, 442, 123
Cal. Rptr. 649, 658 (1975).
38, See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601-02 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 149, 425 P.2d
346, 347-48 (1967); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 302, 208 A.2d 638, 642
(1965). For a thorough discussion of the developing trends in this field, see Keeton, Insurance
Law Rights At Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970). For an excellent
synopsis of the rationale behind this evolution, see Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d
111, 119-20, 539 P.2d 433, 439, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 655 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Cannon v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 263 Md. 463, 470, 283 A.2d 404, 408
(1971); Thomas v. Chesapeake Life Ins. Co., 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 360, 367-68, 313 A.2d 332, 336
(1973). See also G. COUCH, supra note 11, § 14:36, at 616.
40. Justice Manderino authored the majority opinion.
41. 479 Pa. at 583-93, 388 A.2d at 1348-53. The court acknowledged the existence of tem-
porary insurance contracts in Pennsylvania, and reviewed the holdings in Stonsz, McAvoy, and
Ransom Id. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 18-39 and accompanying text supra.
42. 479 Pa. at 583, 388 A.2d at 1348, citing 12 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§ 7221-7233, at 306-47 (1943); G. COUCH, supra note 11, §§ 14:26-:46, at 605-33. See
note 41 supra.
43. 479 Pa. at 586-93, 388 A.2d at 1350-53. For a discussion of adhesion and its applicability
to insurance contracts, see notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
44. 479 Pa. at 588, 388 A.2d at 1350 (citation omitted). See note 14 supra.
45. 479 Pa. at 590, 593, 388 A.2d at 1351, 1353.
46. Id. at 590, 388 A.2d at 1351. Moreover, the court suggested that the use of conditional
receipts tends to encourage deception. Id. at 592, 388 A.2d at 1352. In support of this proposi-
[VOL. 24: p. 800
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Pursuant to these concepts, the Collister court promulgated the basic
principle applicable to the instant case:
[W]here the circumstances of the transaction do not indicate that
the insurer intended to provide interim insurance, but neverthe-
less show that the insurer accepted payment of the first premium
at the time it took the application, it is then up to the insurer to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the consumer had
no reasonable basis for believing that he or she was purchasing
immediate insurance coverage.
4 7
To ascertain the reasonable expectations of the consumer in any given situa-
tion, the court prescribed a thorough examination of the "dynamics of the
insurance transaction." 
4 8
Reviewing the facts in Collister, the court held that Nationwide had
failed to establish convincingly that the applicant could not have entertained
a reasonable expectation of immediate protection.4 9  In support of its de-
termination, the Collister court asserted that the ordinary consumer does not
consider a receipt to be a document of any contractual significance, but
rather as evidence that money has been paid. 50 The court reasoned that
since the receipt here was given only upon payment of the first premium,
the actual transaction had already been completed and any conditions in the
receipt were therefore irrelevant. 51  Additionally, the court found no per-
tion, the Collister court quoted the Supreme Court of Idaho:
We do not mean to imply affirmative misconduct by the soliciting insurance agent. We
suggest only that if nothing is said about the complicated and legalistic phrasing of the
receipt, and the agent accepts an application for insurance together with the first pre-
mium payment, the applicant has reason to believe that he is insured. Otherwise, he is
deceived.
Id., quoting Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151, 154, 483 P.2d 682,
685 (1971). One commentator had directly addressed this problem forty years earlier:
It thus appears that judicial construction has frequently made the binding receipt an
instrument of deception. Unless there should be a speedy change in the attitude of the
majority of the courts, companies that pride themselves on fairness to policyholders would
do well to adopt the receipt form providing for unconditional temporary insurance.
Comment, supra note 12, at 186.
47. 479 Pa. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.
48. Id. at 595, 388 A.2d at 1354. The court stressed the necessity of "an analysis of the
totality of the transaction involved." Id. at 593, 388 A.2d at 1353. Such an analysis, the court
noted, should take into account the importance of the agents' representations in the shaping of
applicants' expectations. Id. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.
49. Id. at 595, 388 A.2d at 1354.
50. Id. at 596, 388 A.2d at 1354.
51. Id. Since the receipt is usually considered by the ordinary consumer to be merely evi-
dence that money has been paid, the Collister court observed that the receipt
is often not taken note of when signed by a trusted advisor in the presence of the con-
sumer. At best, the consumer may possibly glance at the receipt to ascertain that the
correct dollar amount has been entered on the blank space provided or that the document
is signed by the person receiving the money. Frequently, the customer is given such a
receipt while still engaged in conversation with the agent, and always, the receipt is given
after, or simultaneously with, payment of the initial premium. Any conditions which the
insurer has placed within the body of the receipt are therefore irrelevant to the transac-
tion that has just been completed. The payment of money does not indicate a continua-
tion of contract negotiations, but rather their completion. The payment marks the begin-
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suasive evidence that Nationwide's agent had informed the applicant that he
was paying for coverage that would not commence until successful com-
pletion of a medical examination. 52 Under such circumstances, the court
noted that the contents of a binding receipt are to be given no effect in
ascertaining the reasonable expectations of a consumer.5 3 The court's con-
clusion that the applicant could reasonably have expected immediate cover-
age was therefore "not determined by the language of the conditional re-
ceipt, but by the dynamics of the transaction viewed in its entirety." 
54
Finally, discussing alternatives available to insurers, the Collister court
counseled that to avoid liability for the interim period following application,
insurers need only delay acceptance of premium payments until the date on
which coverage is to start. 55 Furthermore, if they wish to impose a con-
dition precedent to interim coverage, the insurers need only "inform the
prospective applicant, before any money changes hands," that advance pay-
ment will bring no immediate unconditional coverage. 56 The court em-
phasized that such notice must not only be timely, but must also be afforded
in a clear and certain manner. 57  These criteria, the court stated, could not
be met by notice printed on a receipt.5 8
ning of performance, which generally occurs after the contract has been entered into. At
that point, the consumer is put in a position of either accepting the receipt as a receipt
and nothing more, or put in a position in which he must ask the insurance agent to
remain silent so that he, the consumer, might have an opportunity to read and study the
document. Furthermore, the consumer might be reluctant to read the document, aware
that such conduct might imply a mistrust of the person with whom he has already made
an agreement, generally after lengthy and personal discussions.
Id. The court might have noted that the only clear provisions of the conditional receipt in
Collister appeared on the reverse side signed by the agent. See note 5 supra. Conceivably, the
ordinary applicant could have assumed that the reverse side was blank.
52. 479 Pa. at 596, 388 A.2d at 1354-55. The court added that "[t]he fact that he informed
appellant's husband that a medical examination was required by the insurer does not affect our
conclusion." Id., 388 A.2d at 1355. For criticism of this finding, see notes 73-79 and accompany-
ing text infra.
53. 479 Pa. at 598, 388 A.2d at 1355. The terms of a conditional receipt seem to have been
deemed ineffectual only to the extent that they impose restrictions on immediate coverage. As
the court explained, if the language of the application and conditional receipt "indicates an
intent on the part of the insurer to provide interim insurance, then such benefits will be
awarded by the court." Id. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.
54. Id. at 595, 388 A.2d at 1354.
55. Id. at 597, 388 A.2d at 1355. This is frequently termed "C.O.D." insurance. Id. As one
court explained, in such a transaction the
payment of the initial premium and delivery of the policy are usually concurrent acts,
thereby creating a period between the signing of the application by the applicant and the
delivery of the policy during which no money has been advanced to the insurance com-
pany, and no insurance is in effect.
Damm v. National Ins. Co. of America, 200 N.W.2d 616, 620 (N.D. 1972), quoting Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 150 n.4, 425 P.2d 346, 348 n.4 (1967).
56. 479 Pa. at 598, 388 A.2d at 1355 (emphasis in original). Such notification, according to
the court, "would have to be given before the consumer paid the initial premium in order to
avoid placing that consumer at the psychological disadvantage of having to ask for a return of
the premium if he or she is dissatisfied with such terms." Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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In an emphatic dissent, Justice Pomeroy criticized the majority for hav-
ing ignored "the clear and unambiguous language of an insurance contract"
to arrive at a result "unsupported by the agreement of the parties."59 The
language used by Nationwide in its conditional receipt, the dissent observed,
explicitly set forth the condition precedent to liability.60  Moreover, ac-
cording to the dissent's reading of the record, the applicant had been orally
informed by the Nationwide agent of all of the policy's terms and condi-
tions.61 Justice Pomeroy thus maintained that there were no ambiguities to
be resolved, and that the contract should have been enforced as written. 62
Given the factual setting in Collister, the dissent stated that the applicant
could not reasonably have entertained any expectations of unconditional in-
terim coverage. 63  Deeming the majority's contrary analysis as so "strained"
that it presented a "complete tour de force," 64 Justice Pomeroy cautioned
that the idea of "recognizing 'reasonable expectations' of an applicant ...
does not mean that a claimant . . . is entitled to every benefit imaginable
within a contractual framework."65
The treatment afforded conditional receipts in Collister radically departs
from established precedent. 66  Almost without exception, courts have dis-
59. Id. at 599, 38 A.2d at 1356 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Justice Pomeroy characterized the
majority as having assumed "a gratuitous regulatory role" over the insurance industry in
Pennsylvania. Id. In a footnote, Justice Pomeroy suggested that insurance companies have
legitimate reasons for requiring payment of premiums before the insurance coverage attaches.
Id. at 600 n. 1, 388 A.2d at 1356 n. 1 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). For a summary of these reasons,
see note 13 supra. See also S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 902A, at 197-213.
60. 479 Pa. at 599, 388 A.2d at 1357 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). For the wording of the
receipt, see note 5 supra.
61. 479 Pa. at 601, 388 A.2d at 1357 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting), citing Record at 12a, 34a,
38a. The application included the following questions, which were both answered in the affirma-
tive by the applicant: "5(a) Have you been informed that medical examination(s) is required for
this application? 5(b) Do you understand that the Company has the right to require medical
examination(s) in which event this application is not complete until such medical examination(s)
is made?" Record at 4a, 12a. In his sworn deposition, the Nationwide agent stated that he had
informed the applicant that a medical examination was required and also that no coverage would
attach until the examination was completed and the results were approved by the home office.
Id. at 34a, 38a. This deposition was uncontroverted under the parties' cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. Id. at 53a, 5 8 a.
62. 479 Pa. at 604, 388 A.2d at 1359 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). See notes 59-61 and accom-
panying text supra. Justice Pomeroy clarified that the dissent was not opposed to the strict
interpretation of ambiguous language in conditional receipts against insurers. 479 Pa. at 604,
388 A.2d at 1359 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Such ambiguity, however, did not exist here:
But in the simple, brief document now before us, there is simply no ambiguity or confus-
ingly technical or convoluted phraseology. It is not the function of a court to rewrite
express and unambiguous terms in a contract to comport with what that court might deem
a fairer result in a particular situation.
Id.
63. 479 Pa. at 608, 388 A.2d at 1361 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 607, 388 A.2d at 1360 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 608, 388 A.2d at 1361 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Justice Pomeroy continued:
"Rather, the approach is an equitable one, meant to guard against the use of complex and
confusing qualifications and exceptions by insurers to defeat the reasonable expectations of the
average layman entering into an insurance transaction." Id. (citation omitted).
66. For a general discussion of the case law prior to Collister, see notes 16-39 and accom-
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regarded interim coverage restrictions imposed in conditional receipts only
where ambiguous language has been used by the insurer and construed by
the court in favor of the insured. 67  In contrast, the conditional receipt in
Collister clearly stated its provisions. 68  Its contents, however, were deemed
irrelevant by the court, 6 9 whose ruling effectively precludes conditional
receipts from having any bearing on the substance of the agreement between
insurer and insured.
70
Unquestionably, the court's innovative construction produced a harsh
result for the defendant in Collister. Nationwide had fully complied with the
Steelnack admonition 71 by clearly stating its condition precedent in the
receipt it issued. 72  Nonetheless, Nationwide was ultimately rendered liable
panying text supra. Many cases have held that where unambiguous language of an application
and/or a conditional receipt provides that the policy is not effective until the company's approval
of the risk, there is no coverage when the intended insured dies prior to such a determination.
See, e.g., Cannon v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 263 Md. 463, 470, 283 A.2d 404, 408 (1971);
Fabrizio v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 248, 251, 494 P.2d 953, 955 (1972); Elliot v.
Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co., 211 Va. 240, 245, 176 S.E.2d 314, 318 (1970); Brown v.
Equitable Life Ins. Co., 60 Wis. 2d 620, 627, 211 N.W.2d 431, 436 (1973).
67. These courts have circumvented the insurer's intention of restricting coverage only
where an applicant could reasonably have interpreted those provisions as indicating immediate
coverage. See, e.g., Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151, 154, 483 P.2d
682, 685 (1971); Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 149, 425 P.2d 346, 348
(1967); Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 53 N.J. 313, 321, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969); Allen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 312, 208 A.2d 638, 646 (1965). But see Young v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 461, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385, rehearing
denied, 272 Cal. App. 2d 462, 78 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1969) (even where language used in condi-
tional receipt is unambiguous, conditions precedent to interim coverage are ineffective unless
called to applicant's attention by soliciting agent).
68. For the contents of the receipt in Collister, see note 5 supra.
69. 479 Pa. at 598, 388 A.2d at 1355.
70. Where conditional receipts are issued upon premium prepayment, according to the Col-
lister court, they are to be ignored in assessing the reasonable expectations of the applicant and
the resultant liability of the insurance company. Id., 388 A.2d at 1354-55. If conditions are to be
placed upon interim coverage, they must be unequivocally revealed before any payment is
accepted, presumably by conspicuous provisions in applications or by agents' representations.
Id. Otherwise, an expectation by the applicant of immediate coverage would be justified and
should thus be enforced regardless of the contents of the conditional receipt. Id. For a further
discussion of the Collister court's analysis and conclusions, see notes 49-58 and accompanying
text supra.
Analogous treatment was recently afforded the policy itself in Rempel v. Nationwide Life
Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 407, 370 A.2d 366, 367 (1977). In Rempel, the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy sued Nationwide, contending that its agent had either negligently or fraudu-
lently misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. Id. Determining that reliance on
these representations had been justified, the court stressed that a policyholder has no duty to
read the policy unless under the circumstances it is unreasonable not to do so. Id. at 411-12,
370 A.2d at 369. The principle is based upon the belief that the significant decision by the
consumer is not made when the policy is received. Id. at 410, 370 A.2d at 368-69. See also
Keeton, supra note 38, at 968. Rather, the applicant makes the decision to buy the insurance at
the time he signs the application. Id. at 410, 370 A.2d at 369. By the time the written policy is
actually received, it has lost its importance to the insured. Id. Presumably, the same reasoning
could apply to binding receipts. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra. See also notes
80-86 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
72. For the contents of the receipt, see note 5 supra. See notes 49-54 and accompanying
text supra.
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in the instant case for the same coverage it had sought to exclude under the
formula supplied by the court itself only a few years before.
Somewhat more unsettling is the readiness with which the court deter-
mined that the dynamics of this particular transaction included no clear evi-
dence that the applicant should reasonably have been aware of the condition
precedent to temporary insurance.
73 As Justice Pomeroy noted in dissent,
74
an examination of the record before the court provided sufficient contrary
indicia to raise serious doubts about the reasonableness of this applicant's
expectation of unconditional coverage. 75  In light of the crucial importance
of precisely determining which expectations were reasonable, the court's
summary disposal of this issue remains puzzling. 76 There was, however, no
genuine issue concerning the lack of clarity in the application provision
which specified the condition precedent. 77 This provision was quite difficult
to comprehend, as it was couched in highly legalistic phrasing and spread
within a single protracted sentence of more than 260 words. 78  It is sub-
mitted that this aspect of the transaction, rather than any additional
"dynamics," served as the primary factual influence upon the formulation of
the court's ruling.
79
While not immune to criticism, the majority's reasoning is likewise not
without its logical and pragmatic appeal. The court based its holding upon
the assumption that the reasonable expectation of the insured has become
the focal point of the insurance transaction,8" a position that has been
adopted in a considerable number of jurisdictions.8 ' Once this premise is
accepted, the proposition that a conditional receipt enters the transaction at
too late a time to have any contractual significance would appear entirely
73. 479 Pa. at 595, 388 A.2d at 1354-55.
74. Id. at 601, 388 A.2d at 1357 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
75. For a discussion of these contrary indicia, see note 61 supra.
76. The majority discussed reasonable expectations in an abstract sense, and apparently paid
little attention to the actual facts in Collister. 479 Pa. at 595-96, 388 A.2d at 1354. See notes 48,
50 & 51 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the court in Collister sought to
prescribe a new standard of contractual conduct for insurers in transactions similar to the one
here. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text infra.
77. For the language of the application, see note 4 supra.
78. See id. In its brief, counsel for the plaintiff bluntly appraised Nationwide's choice of
words: "To read the bottom page of the application ... is enough to induce a headache in a
person trained in the use of words, let alone the applicant in this case, whose occupation was
long distance truck driving." Brief for Appellant at 12 (citations omitted), Collister v. Nation-
wide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 871 (1979). The
court had similarly expressed its disapproval of the insurance industry's use of such "lengthy,
complex, and cumbersomely written" documents, as well as the resulting unconscionable decep-
tion of consumers. 479 Pa. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.
79. See note 76 supra.
80. 479 Pa. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.
81. See notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text supra. Interestingly, the current emphasis was
forecast by the Stonsz court in 1936 when it perceived "a trend in the courts to construe the
conditions liberally, and to treat receipts ... as binding during the interim regardless of the
ultimate action of the carrier on the application." 324 Pa. at 102, 187 A. at 405. The assumption
underlying this trend, according to Stonsz, was the belief that "no other result could have been
intended by the parties" if the receipt were to have any significance, "for unless the insured was
to be protected ...during the interim period there would be no advantage to him in paying
his premium in advance." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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reasonable. An application for life insurance, when coupled with premium
prepayment, is equivalent to an offer by the applicant to buy a policy from
the insurance carrier. 82  As suggested by the majority, it is normal for an
applicant to assume that the insurer's receipt of his money constitutes an
acceptance of his offer and the conclusion of the contract formation pro-
cess. 83  This assumption is simply one component of the applicant's reason-
able expectations, which courts have become reluctant to frustrate. 8
4
Moreover, it is a fundamental contract principle that a party may not unilat-
erally impose additional terms upon an already concluded agreement., 5
There thus appears to be no justification, other than custom, for allowing
such a practice in life insurance transactions through the use of conditional
receipts. 
86
It is submitted that as a result of Collister, life insurers in Pennsylvania
will be required to include conspicuously and clearly all temporary insurance
provisions in their application forms if they wish to delay coverage while
enjoying the benefits derived from advance premium payments.8 7  The
function of binding receipts in life insurance transactions has thus been ef-
fectively limited to the documentation of advance payment.8 8 The signifi-
82. J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 13, at 87. These authors have explained: "By
submitting the premium with his application, the applicant makes it clear that he intends to
enter into a contractual relation with the insurance company." Id. at 90. Where no premium
accompanies the application, the applicant is making an invitation to the insurer to make an
offer. Id. at 83. If the insurer subsequently decides to issue a policy, it does so by making an
offer to the applicant. Id. There is, however, no contract until payment of the premium, which,
in any situation, is the single most crucial component of the whole transaction. Id.
83. 479 Pa. at 596, 388 A.2d at 1354. See notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra; note
81 supra.
84. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
85. See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 11, §§ 99-103, at 367-96.
86. This line of reasoning is in accord with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's reasoning
in Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 370 A.2d 366 (1977). For a discussion of
Rempel, see note 70 supra. The decision to purchase insurance in the type of transaction in-
volved in Colister is, as suggested in Rempel, made when the application is signed and the
money paid. 471 Pa. at 409-10, 370 A.2d at 368-69. Once the conditional receipt is issued, any
terms contained therein are arguably unimportant to the insured. See id.
87. For a discussion of these benefits, see notes 13 & 14 supra. It is important to note that
in Collister, Nationwide did indeed include all temporary insurance terms in the application.
See text accompanying note 4 supra. These terms, however, were evidently deemed inoperative
due to the obscurity of the language in which they were stated. See notes 77-79 and accompany-
ing text supra.
88. The dissent in Collister suggested that such regulation is within the sole province of the
legislature. 479 Pa. at 600 n.1, 388 A.2d at 1356 n.1 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). As Justice
Pomeroy stated: "'I am of the opinion that this Court has neither the responsibility nor the
expertise to balance" the considerations of insurers militating against interim coverage "with
those conflicting considerations favoring coverage of an applicant pending approval of his appli-
cation." Id. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has reached a similar conclusion:
It is not within the province of this court to determine what coverage, in its good
conscience, the life insurance industry should be required to offer .... That function is
vested by the legislature in the office of the commissioner of insurance. We do not have
the power to create a new contract for the parties. Thus, while we may not approve of
such a sales device as a conditional receipt and would like to see interim insurance af-
forded, we are powerless to so legislate.
Brown v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 60 Wis. 2d 620, 630, 211 N.W.2d 431, 436 (1973). For
examples of legislation in this area, see note 94 infra.
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cance, and hence usage, of binding receipts will apparently endure only to
serve that purpose.8 9
The impact of Collister upon the insurance industry in general should
not be underestimated. 90 Few consumers have been spared the task of
attempting to decipher the technical language in insurance instruments. 9 '
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania intended in Collister
to signal the end of judicial tolerance for the insurance industry's persistent
employment of the confusing jargon that has been the source of frequent
litigation.9 2 Perhaps in anticipation of such a judicial posture, at least one
major insurance company has redrafted its policies in very simple language,
emphasizing the clarity of its insurance instruments in its advertising. s 3 It is
expected that in the near future other insurance carriers will follow suit.
9 4
William Jackson
89. For discussion of the intended function of binding receipts, see notes 11-17 and accom-
panying text supra.
90. It is submitted that the Collister court went far beyond the principle of honoring the
reasonable expectations of the insured and actually rewrote the contract between the parties.
Such rewriting, according to one commentator, amounts to an "explicit judicial endorsement of
a new ground of decision-a development connoted by the term 'doctrine.' " Keeton, Reason-
able Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275, 276 (1976).
91. Some illuminating comments were made by several justices of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey during oral arguments in Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d
328 (1966). See JURY VERDICT WEEKLY NEWS, Jan. 13, 1969, at 3. Chief Justice Weintraub,
after looking at the insurance policy involved, stated: "I don't know what it means. I am
stumped. They say one thing in big type and in small type they take it away." L. FULLER & M.
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 558 (3d ed. 1972), quoting JURY VERDICT WEEKLY NEWS,
supra, at 3. Justice Haneman added: "I can't understand half of my insurance policies." L.
FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra, at 558, quoting JURY VERDICT WEEKLY NEWS, supra, at 3.
Justice Francis voiced what has long been the suspicion of many consumers: "I get the impres-
sion that insurance companies keep the language of their policies deliberately obscure." L.
FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra, at 558, quoting JURY VERDICT WEEKLY NEWS, supra, at 3.
Confusion has frequently been further magnified by the use of conditional receipts, which have
never been favored by courts. See note 46 supra.
92. It has been inferred from the insurers' failure to remedy this situation by appropriate
language that insurance "companies would rather assume a calculated risk in an isolated case
... than lose the benefits flowing from the general acceptance of premiums in advance, thus
binding and committing the insured immediately to the contract as written." Wood v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 F. Supp. 371, 374 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 802
(9th Cir. 1962).
93. Sentry Insurance Company (Sentry) has devised "plain talk" policies, in which emphasis
is placed on brevity and high readability. Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Com-
pleted or Revolution Begun?, 1978 INS. L.J. 573, 581. These policies exhibit a rather dramatic
reduction in the average number of syllables per word and the average number of words per
sentence. Id. They are set in 11-point type, instead of the conventional 8-point, and adopt a
personal approach, referring to "you" and "we" in place of the traditional third person formality.
Id. The result is a substantially shorter document with the understandability of a typical news-
stand magazine. Id. For the full text of Sentry's "Plain Talk Car Policy," see id. at 584-86. See
generally Reuthershan & Kunze, Who Wants A New Insurance Policy?, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 753
(1975).
94. There has been some legislative activity in this area. For example, the Pennsylvania
Unfair Insurance Practices Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.1-.15 (Purdon Supp. 1978),
authorizes the Insurance Commissioner to make rules regarding the language of insurance in-
struments. Id. §§ 1171.7-.13. A New York law requires that all consumer contracts be "written
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... in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and every day meanings." N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-701(b)(1) (McKinney 1978). Similarly, a Massachusetts statute passed late
in 1977 promulgates rules governing the style, organization, and appearance of policies. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 2B (West Supp. 1978). It is submitted that legislation, properly
refined and implemented, could ultimately lead to standardized application forms and policies
whose use would obviate much of the need for litigation concerning the rights and liabilities of
insurer and insured. See Gardner, supra note 93, at 581-83.
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